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RECENT CASES
CHARITIES
NECESSITY OF A CHARITABLE PURPOSE TO ESTAB-
LISH A CHARITABLE TRUST
The will of Mary Swayze contained the following clause:
"I direct my executor to reduce sufficient of my estate to
cash, such cash to be utilized for the erection and maintenance
of a modern hotel at Virginia City, Montana, where no in-
toxicating liquors are to be sold at any time, said hotel to be
maintained as a memorial to me, and I direct my executor to
cause the formation of a corporation to be known as the Mary
Swayze Memorial Hotel Company, to which corporation said
hotel is to be conveyed, and by which it is to be maintained
and operated." In a suit to determine heirship under the will
the trial court held that the clause in question was void for
uncertainty due to indefiniteness of the beneficiaries. On
appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment holding
that the clause in question could not be deemed to be a trust
for a charitable use in the absence of a charitable purpose
on the part of the testatrix. In re Swayze's Estate, 191 P.2d
322 (Mont. 1948).
The problem before the Court in the present case was to
determine whether there could be a valid charitable purpose
in a will which provides for the formation of a corporation
to erect and maintain a hotel in a community as a memorial
to the testatrix when there is no provision as to the manner
of distributing the profits.
"Charity in its legal sense comprises four principal di-
visions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the ad-
vancement of education; trusts for the advancement of re-
ligion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the com-
munity not falling under any of the preceding heads."1 Ob-
viously the present case comes under the heading of benefit
to the community. The test is whether the purpose is of a
character sufficiently beneficial to the community to justify
permitting property to be devoted forever to its accomplish-
ment.
1. Lord Macnaghten in The Commission For Special Purposes of
the Income Tax v. Pemsel, A.C. 531, 583 (1891); Restatement,
"Trusts" §368 (1939).
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In the present case the Court states that a trust is chari-
table if there is a direct tangible benefit to each member of
the community. 2 In this way it justified previous decisions
that held libraries,3 art museums,4 historical monuments, "'
homes for the aged and indigent," and public utilities' to be
valid charitable trusts. The Court then went on to say that
indirect benefit to the community is not the sole test of a
charity,8 thus implying that something more must be shown
before the trust will be considered charitable. This distinc-
tion is impracticable and should not be applied in this or any
other case regarding charitable trusts.
If a bequest furthers the social interest of the community
there is then a true benefit to the community." A public
building, such as a town hall10 or theater" has been held to
advance the social interest of a community. It is difficult to
2. "Certainly where there is a direct and tangible benefit to each
member of the community the trust would be valid." In re
Swayze's Estate, 191 P.2d 322, 326 (Mont. 1948). A bequest
may directly benefit only a small class within the community, yet
t.here is an indirect benefit to the entire community. See Quinn
v. Peoples Trust and Savings Co., 223 Ind. 617, 60 N.E.2d 281(1945); Sherman v. Shaw, 243 Mass. 257, 137 N.E. 374 (1922);
In re Jackson's Estate, 175 Misc. 882, 25 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1940).
3. Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 34 N.E. 467 (1893).
4. In re Everson's Will, 268 App. Div. 425, 52 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1944).
5. Lawrence v. Prosser, 89 N.J.Eq. 248, 104 AtI. 772 (1918).
6. Burke Ex'r v. Crawfordsville Trust Co., 103 Ind. App. 1, 2 N.E.2d
817 (1936).
7. In Todd v. Citizens Gas Co. of Indianapolis, 46 F.2d 855 (C.C.A.
7th 1931), the defendant established a gas company by issuing
stock certificates in the amount of $2,000,000 which were to be
held in trust by the trustees who in turn issued trust certificates
to the holders of the stock. The charter provided that after the
outstanding stock together with dividends of 10% per annum was
paid the corporation was to cease existing and the plant was to
revert to the city of Indianapolis. In an action to prevent rever-
sion to the city the plaintiff contended that a public utility such
as this could not be recognized in law as a charitable trust. The
court held that it was a charitable trust, as it benefitted an
indefinite number of persons. The erection of public buildings
or works is a charitable purpose even though it is not called a
charity in the gift itself. But cf. Doughton v. Vandever, 5 Del.
Ch. 51 (1875).
8. "And if intangible benefit to individuals is to be the sole test then
a trust for the establishment of a creamery or a canning factory
or a pulp mill can also be considered charitable because of the
indirect benefits that would inure to the residents as a result of
the establishment of such industries." In re Swayze's Estate, 191
P.2d 322, 327 (Mont. 1948).
9. Restatement, "Trusts" §374 (1935).
10. Shannonhouse v. Wolfe, 191 N.C. 769, 133 S.E. 93 (1926).
11. Nixon v. Brown, 46 Nev. 439, 214 Pac. 524 (1923).
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conceive that a hotel could be placed in the category of a
public building, especially when a public building is defined
as one that is ordinarily supported by taxes paid by the
people of the community; 12 however, a hotel does advance the
social interest and is thus a benefit to the community. A
hotel is not less directly beneficial to the community in the
form of public improvement than a bequest to a city for the
erection of a gate to a public park" or the erection of a granite
tower with a carillon of eighteen bells.'4 In other respects
the community would be directly benefited by supplying em-
ployment to those who would participate in the erection of
the hotel and also to those who would participate in the main-
tenance of the hotel. On the other hand, not every bequest to
a community that would directly benefit an individual mem-
ber of the community can be considered a charitable trust.
If a bequest were made to a city, the income to be paid to
each individual member of the community it would not be
charitable because the social interest would not be advanced
thereby. 5 It can readily be seen that the test of directness
of benefits is not valid in determining the existence of a
charitable trust. 6 Something more must be shown in order
to make this trust of a charitable nature.
The testatrix did not use the word "charity" at any place
in her will. Although this is not necessary when a charitable
intent is shown by construing the entire will, 7 yet it would
have aided considerably in showing that the dominant purpose
of the testatrix was charity rather than private benefit. The
will as construed merely shows that the testatrix instructed
her trustee to reduce enough of her estate to cash for the
purpose of erecting a hotel in Virginia City as a memorial
to her. A corporation was to be formed by the trustee for
the purpose of maintaining the hotel. No restriction was
placed on the corporation as to the distribution of net profits.
It could apply the profits to a charitable purpose if it so
12. 3 Scott, "Trusts" §373 (1939).
13. Haggin v. International Trust Co., 69 Colo. 135, 169 Pac. 138(1917).
14. In re Butin's Estate, 183 P.2d 304 (Cal. 1947).
15. Restatement, "Trusts" §374 (1935).
16. Extensive research disclosed no previous case or authority that
based a charitable trust on the test of directness of benefits.
17. Todd v. Citizens Gas Co. of Indianapolis, supra, n.7; Dickinson
y, City of Anna, 310 II. 222, 141 N.E. 754 (1923).
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desired. It could apply the profits to the benefit of its mem-
bers or it could reinvest the profits which would create a
private trust in the absence of a charitable purpose and violate
the rule against perpetuities. 18
In the present case the charitable purpose must be found
in the gift of the hotel and not in the manner in which the
profits are to be distributed. The Court excluded evidence
offered by the defendant showing that Virginia City is a
city of great historical significance in the State of Montana
and a county seat, resulting in a large influx of visitors. The
only hotel at Virginia City was destroyed by fire about ten
years prior to the beginning of this action and was never
replaced. Had this evidence been allowed it would have aided
considerably in showing the extent of the public interest in a
hotel at Virginia City, thus indicating a charitable purpose on
the part of the testatrix. Once the charitable purpose of the
testatrix was established the fact that the beneficiaries
were indefinite would not have defeated the charitable trust,
but on the contrary, would have aided in establishing the
trust as a charitable bequest. 9 The doctrine of cy pres could
have been invoked as to the distribution of the net profits, 20
18. The cases are in conflict as to accumulations in a trust where a
charitable purpose is shown. In Porter v. Baynard, 28 So.2d 890,(Fla. 1946) the testatrix left the residue of her estate in trust
with one-half of the income to be devoted to specified charities
and the other half to be reinvested with the principal in per-
petuity. The court held the entire bequest void because the finan-
cial provisions of the fund and the bequests were inseparable.
But cf. Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134 N.E. 276 (1922)
where, on a similar fact situation the court upheld the entire be-
quest as valid stating that a court of equity could limit the accumu-
lation so that it would not become a public menace. For an en-
lightening note on accumulations see 33 Virginia Law Review
529 (1947). In Trust Co. of Georgia v. Williams, 184 Ga. 706,
192 S.E. 913 (1937) testator made a bequest to be held in trust
for the establishment of a hospital at which reasonable rates
were to be charged as a memorial to him. The court held that
the trust was a private one on the grounds that there would be
uncontrolled direction by the trustee without any requirement
that actual charitable work be done.
19. Pratt v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 15 Cal. App. 2d 630, 59
P.2d 862 (1936); Hulet v. Crawfordsville Trust Co., 69 N.E.2d
823 (Ind. App. 1946); Clevenger v. Rio Farms, 204 S.W.2d 40(Tex. 1947).
20. Quinn v. Peoples Trust & Savings Co., 223 Ind. 617, 60 N.E.2d
281 (1945). Testatrix left the residue of her estate in trust with
the income to be used to educate the children of the employees
of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Only one person at a time was
to receive the benefit of the bequest which was not to exceed $800
per year for a four year period. It so happened that the income
from the estate would far exceed this figure and the court held
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and the memorial would have been considered only incidental
to the main purpose of the testatrix.21 The majority opinion
disregarded this evidence stating: "We cannot say that these
purposes would warrant the setting aside of such a salutary
rule as the rule against restraint of alienation, nor can we
justifiably say that it would warrant the creation of a tax-free
corporation to compete in the identical business with private
corporations or private hotel owners.1' 22
In arriving at its decision the Court was greatly influenced
by an alleged public policy which disapproves of tax-exempt
corporations competing with privately-owned corporations in
the same line of business. This may be true as a general
rule, but it is not a tenable legal argument on which to base a
decision in the absence of legislative enactment.23  On the
other hand courts have used the public policy argument as
one that urges them to construe bequests as charitable when-
ever they can.24 Thus when the court enters the realm of
public policy, as an argument for or against the construction
of trusts as charitable, there are two opposing forces, the one
equally balancing the other. The problem of tax free corpora-
tions competing with private corporations is not presented
here as there is no other hotel in Virginia City. No doubt
the public policy to which the Court refers would be more
applicable in a city with competing hotels; however, even in
such a case a charitable trust would not be invalidated where
a charitable purpose is shown simply because it competes.
Since a charitable corporation may own property subject to
that the doctrine of cy pres was in effect in Indiana and that
as long as a charitable purpose was shown the trustee could select
an increased number of children until the yearly income was
exhausted.
21. Under common law a bequest for the upkeep of testator's burial
plot was held to be a private purpose thus violating the rule
against perpetuities. Heinlein v. Elyria Savings & Trust Co.,
75 Ohio App. 353, 62 N.E.2d 284 (1945). To remedy this, Indiana
and many other states have passed statutes upholding this type
of bequest. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §21-212.
22. In re Swayze's Estate, 191 P.2d 322, 327 (Mont. 1948).
23. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hardin, 206 Ark. 593, 176 S.W.2d
903 (1944); Spencer v. City of Alhambra, 44 Cal. App. 2d 75, 111
P.2d 910 (1941); Park Construction Co. v. Independent School
District No. 32, Carver County, 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W 475
(1941); Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Couillens, 176 Tenn. 300,
140 S.W.2d 1088 (1940).
24. In re Lowe's Estate, 70 N.E.2d 187 (Ind. 1946) ; Scobey v. Beck-
man, 111 Ind. App. 574, 41 N.E.2d 847 (1942); Moskowitz v.
Federman, 72 Ohio App. 149, 51 N.E.2d 48 (1943).
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the same taxes as privately owned corporations when that
property is not used for strictly charitable purposes,25 the
argument used by the Montana court loses much of its validity.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY USE OF COERCED
CONFESSIONS
After conviction of murder in the first degree for the
killing of a police officer, appellant brought error, charging
that the confession used against him at the trial had been
obtained through coercion and violence and had been incor-
rectly admitted as evidence by the trial court. The undisputed
evidence showed that appellant had been captured soon after
the killing and had been severely beaten by the police who
had arrested him. After the beating he was taken to police
headquarters where he was questioned that night in the pres-
ence of several of the officers who had beaten him. The
confession in controversy followed. At the time appellant
made his confession he had neither been advised of his rights
nor seen his counsel. In reversing the conviction the Indiana
Supreme Court held that the circumstances warranted a find-
ing by the court that the confession had been obtained through
coercion and was therefore inadmissible as evidence. Johnson
v. State, 78 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 1948).
The problem confronting the court was one of determin-
ing whether the circumstances under which the confession
was secured constituted a denial of due process of law as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment., By reviewing
the means by which this confession was obtained, the court
departed from the precedent set forth by 1revious Indiana
cases which had stated the proposition that the circumstances
attendant upon the securing of a criminal confession are
issues of fact for determination by the trial court only, and
that the findings so made should not be disturbed by appellate
courts.2 The position expressed by the Supreme Court of the
25. City Temple Institutional Society of Denver v. McGuire, 104 Colo.
11, 87 P.2d 760 (1939); Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Board of
Assessors, 294 Mass. 248, 1 N.E.2d 6 (1936).
1. For the most comprehensive treatment of the subject generally
see McCormick, "Some Problems and Developments in the Ad-
missibility of Confessions" 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239 (1946).
2. "This court will not weigh the evidence given in the trial court
upon the competency of the admission in evidence of a written
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